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Objective. Both the growing number of U.S. testators and the increased amount 
of money involved in their intergenerational transfers make it necessary to iden- 
tify their motivations. Indeed, existing patterns of social stratification both within 
and across familial groups should be affected. Methods. The analysis is based 
on secondary analyses of existing but scattered data. Results. Three motivations 
(pursuit of efficiency, commitment to reciprocity, and search for ascriptive 
equality) and their social determinants are identified. A research agenda is pro- 
posed to assess their distributions in the U.S. population at large as well as to 
evaluate their implications on existing patterns of inequality. Conclusions. The 
completion of the agenda would help understand better the dynamics governing 
the interaction between economic and cultural capital. 
In view of both the growing number of U.S. testators and the in- 
creased value of their estates, one might suspect that changes in the 
amount, the type, the date, and the beneficiaries of these bequests will 
alter the existing forms of social stratification (McNamee and Miller, 
1989).* Taking into account the scattered and sparse empirical litera- 
ture on the topic of inheritance in the United States, I seek here to sketch 
the major motivations that govern the practices of these testators. There 
are three such motivations: (1) the pursuit of efficiency, (2) the sense 
of reciprocity, and (3) the commitment to ascriptive justice. 
*Direct all correspondence to Remi Clignet, ORSTOM, 213, rue La Fayette, 75480 
Paris Cedex 10, France. 
'The value of U.S. estates will double between the period 1987-91 and the turn of 
the century to reach $1.7 billion (Farnham, 1990). This increase, which reflects both the 
growth of the U.S. economy and the diffusion of public and private retirement programs 
(Hill, 1970), should be associated with an increase in the frequency of testacy. The grow- 
ing diversity of the symbols, values, and beliefs adopted by the members of the same 
familial groups induce most of them to write their own wills rather than accept the 
constraints of intestate laws (Cheal, 1991). The rising level of formal schooling leads 
many Americans to choose testacy and select what they give to whom and when (McCubbin 
and Rosenfeld, 1989a, 1989b; Fellows, Simon, and Rau, 1978). 
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I propose to delineate their respective features by assessing the em- 
phasis that each of them places on assets, actors, and the timing of 
transfers. Since the validity of any taxonomy depends in part on the 
hypotheses it helps generate, I conclude the paper by presenting the re- 
search agenda that can be derived from the discussion. This agenda in- 
volves not only an assessment of the distribution of the motivations held 
by testators across major social categories and their shifts over time but 
also an inquiry into the marginal status assigned to the study of inher- 
itance in the sociological literature. 
The Sociological Challenges of Contemporary Inheritance 
As a preliminary step to the examination of heirship practices, it is 
necessary to locate them in the general system of exchanges that prevails 
in the society under study. Strathern (1985:202) argued that, although 
bourgeois folk modeling introduces significant separations between per- 
sons and things, all property relations involve the construction of con- 
nections between persons and things. 
This construction rests upon two distinct logics. The logic of com- 
modities regulates the exploitation of clients or of employees through 
an impersonal search for profit. In contrast, the logic of gifts shapes the 
idiosyncratic strengthening of distinct forms of social solidarity through 
transfers mortis causa as well as through gifts inter vivos (Carrier, 1991). 
The emergence of corporate capitalism has intensified contradictions 
between these two logics. Hence, Durkheim (1957), amongst other so- 
ciologists, sought to explain the likely demise of inheritance in industrial 
societies.2 The form and the extent of these contradictions, however, 
continue to be distinctively experienced across major social categories 
as well as across specific episodes of the modern era. Thus, even if in- 
heritance is a vestigial form of interrelation, it is still necessary to de- 
termine whether its decline is selective, and to explain the selective sur- 
vival and the mutation of its forms (Gouldner, 1960:162-63). 
Regardless of the shifts that societal change entails in the logic of 
gifts, testators keep passing judgments on the forms of capital they have 
accumulated, on their potential heirs, and on the optimal form of the 
interrelation between the tw0 .3  Now, as in the past, “the manner of 
splitting property is a manner of splitting people,” which is to say that 
2Durkheim underlined the role that professional organizations were supposed to play 
as beneficiaries of the wealth accumulated. 
3These motivations may be derived only indirectly through the analysis of the actual 
practices of testators. Thus, one cannot distinguish the individualistic and altruistic ori- 
entations of testators by looking only at the identity of the will beneficiaries (Schwartz, 
1993). The discourse used by testators is a t  least as important, providing that the final 
version of a will is not treated in the same way as its earlier versions or a fortiori as 
mere intentions. 
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as individuals consider how they w d l  divide their assets they also rank- 
order their prospective heirs (Goody, 19765). 
Thus, the particular relationship between assets and heirs that inher- 
itance represents takes several forms. At one estreme of the continuum 
of possible solutions, some testators practice partibility, that is, they 
divide their wealth into equal shares. Most frequent in the case of large 
and diversified estates, the practice is also facilitated by the generalized 
use of money. Today, some testators go so far as to ask their executors 
to sell all assets, in order to render all of their bequests formally equal. 
At the opposite end of the same continuum, others practice impartibility 
and attribute to specific persons the major part or the totality of their 
estate. As they distinguish assets that generate significant incomes or 
valuable savings from the remainder of their estate, they posit an ap- 
propriate fit between the rank-ordering of the dominant forms of capi- 
tal accumulated and the hierarchy of eligible heim4 
A Typology of Motivations for Selecting Heirs 
Both partibility and impartibility are subject to the distinct influences 
of material constraints or  opportunities and of cultural rules defining 
who should get what and when. On the one hand, the mimurit of wealth 
owned conditions the way estates are transferred across generations. In 
the United States wealth tends to perpetuate itself. as exemplified hy the 
stability of the distribution of inherited wealth across social categories 
between the pre-Jacksonian era and now (Pessen, 1973; Sorokin, 1925). 
Similarly, as hlarx had seen, ‘ùpon the different forms of property, rises 
(also) an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed senti- 
ments, illusions. and modes of thought” (Newby et al., 1979:24). Tech- 
nological innovations modify the types of assets market present in the 
market, their prices, or the value they hold in relation to ont. another, 
as illustrated by increases in both the number of individuals n7ho hold 
stocks, bonds, and saving certificates rather than real estate and in the 
value of these investments (Cligner, 1997). Underlying chmges in the 
structure of opportunities and constraints and, hence, in both the risks 
incurred and the returns yielded are accompanied hy parallel changes 
in the dominant strategies of transfers. For example, owners of “mod- 
ern” forms of investments such as stocks or honds tend to favor their 
surviving spouse over their offywing more often than landowners (Clignet, 
1992). Further, the former endow more often all of their children with 
identical bequests (Rubinstein, 1980). 
On the other hand, differences in strategies of accumulation mirror 
also culturally relative rationales (Thompson, 1979). For example, the 
“his choice. however, does not necessari11 preclude coinmitnient to equity. The heir 
chosen m q  he expected t o  compensate the remaining henefici.irie<. 
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acquisition of life insurance now perceived as inspired by a legitimate 
concern for survivors was initially decried as a form of illegitimate gam- 
bling (Zelizer, 1979). Similar “irrational” motivations affect inheritance 
practices (Weber, 1968).5 As an example, German or Irish farmers set- 
tled in the Midwest retain the models of their forebears more often than 
they adapt their practices to the size of their holdings or to the nature 
of their enterprises (Salamon, 1980; Carroll and Salamon, 1988). 
To conclude, both accumulation and heirship strategies are informed 
by two analytically distinct factors. Testators seek to consolidate fa- 
milial wealth by taking into account both their material surroundings 
and the number of their eligible heirs. As a result, their decisions are 
inspired by the principle of rationality, with its references to universal- 
istic criteria shaped by a succession of ephemeral time frames. However, 
the same decisions are also informed by the need to do things “the right 
way” and to conform with the catalog of prescriptions and proscrip- 
tions that significant reference groups adopt to regulate the selection of 
heirs, as well as the form, amount, and timing of bequests. In other 
words, heirship strategies are also informed by the culturally relative 
and slowly evolving qualities of the principle of legitimacy. To be sure, 
the two principles (rationality and legitimacy) operate jointly, but their 
mix takes specific forms conditioned by the relative importance at- 
tached to each heirship motivation amongst various social categories or 
at distinct historical moments. 
Heirship and the Pursuit of Efficiency 
Adam Smith coined the term efficiency to suggest that the greater the 
production of a population in relation to its size, the greater the effi- 
ciency of the system. Thus, the notion of efficiency foreshadowed the 
concept of productivity and its subsequent elaboration. By extension, 
the term efficiency has come to evoke the disparity between the sums 
invested and the benefits people derive from them. 
Since the term efficiency marks seemingly the underlying triumph of 
the logic of the commodity over the logic of the gift, it seems at odds 
with the notion of inheritance. The contradiction disappears, however, 
when the term inheritance is used to evoke the perpetuation of familial 
rather than individual riches and identities. Indeed, this stance enables 
analysts and testators alike to reconcile individualistic and altruistic ori- 
entations or utilitarian and moral concerns. The challenge faced by both 
is then to explain transfers mortis causa or gifts in terms of the costs 
5 Weber used the term “irrational” to highlight the fact that these motivations are 
rooted in the traditions of the people under study, prior to their current residence, or 
that they represent factors that were “rational” initially before being frozen into tradi- 
tional precepts. 
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and benefits that testators expect the entire familial group to derive from 
the will (Becker, 198 I ;  Masson and Pestiaux, 1991). 
Since references to pragmatism suggest that the quest of efficiency 
should prevail among individuals who have drawn their wills suffi- 
ciently early in their lives to he in a position to evaluate the conse- 
quences of their choices, this particular motivation should he infre- 
quent. Most testators procrastinate or change wills during their lives. 
Alternatively, the piirsuit of efficiency may still be evident under a set 
of joint assumptions. While testators should write wills in order to con- 
trol the lives of their descendents after their own death (Thurow, 1975), 
the criteria used to evaluate the efficiency of the decisions taken should 
he sufficiently stable to be shared by adjacent generations. 
The Empirical Bases of the Pursuit of Efficiency. The perpetuation of 
domestic capital requires testators to adopt hvo independent lines of 
conduct. First, they mu5t strive to minimize the claims of privileged 
creditors, notably those of the state. Thus, they evaluate the provisions 
of wills in fiscal terms. Now, as in the past, many Americans evaluate 
the major purpose of estate planning in terms of neutralizing a variety 
of disincentib es developed by public authorities (Schwartz, 1993). 
Second, the perpetuation of capital requires wealth holders to identify 
a Strateg) of transfer that capitalizes on the peculiarities of the current 
economic situation. Testators motivated by the pursuit of efficiency di- 
vide their estate into equal shares whenever they occupy a sufficiently 
preeminent position in a number of different social arenas. Founders or 
perpetuators of dynasties offer a case in point. In order to kecp their 
influence on the organizations they already control, heads of dynasties 
appoint specific heirs to the most significant boards on which they sit 
(Wyatt Brown, 1982; hlarcus, 1989. Odendahl, 1990). Heirship prac- 
tices of the :iristocratic families of the commercial and agricultural South 
or of the industrial North (Rockefeller, Guggenheim, etc.) often illus- 
trate the underlying concerns. 
Alternatively, wealth holders motivated by the quest for efficiency rely 
on impartibility whenever various forms of scarcity threaten economic 
life and its growth. Historicall), impartibility has persisted longer in 
those parts of the United States where the early growth of a market 
economy required the concentration of sparse capital than in areas where 
the ahundance of land facilitated the division of a lineage into smaller 
units (Aston and Schapiro, 1984; Ditz, 1987). This particular practice 
remained dominant wherever agriculture was the only possible avenue 
of economic development (Bouchard, 1994). Today, the incidence of 
impartibility continues to characterize those testators whose wealth is 
limited (híenchik, 1980). In addition, impartibility remains hish in the 
case of assets that cannot be distributed without rationing. Impartihilit)- 
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thus characterizes owners of real estate wherever the acreage of avail- 
able land keeps declining (Rubinstein, 1980). Similarly, the currently 
soaring costs of higher education force testators to select the one child 
they will send to the most prestigious institution (Becker, 198 1; Langbein, 
1989; Becker and Tomes, 1986; Steelman and Powell, 1991). Finally, 
businessmen tend to choose the same strategy as a result of the diver- 
gence between the logic governing the transfer of money and that gov- 
erning the transfer of power. Money may be divided into equal shares, 
but power cannot be. Coalitions are fragile, as illustrated by the inabil- 
ity of Wang, the owner of a large computer concern, to prevail upon 
his associates to accept his son as the heir of his company (Cohen, 1990). 
The Selection of Heirs: Gender and Birth Order. As the quest for 
efficiency requires testators to match the economic capital to be passed 
down with the abilities and motivations imputed to eligible heirs, the 
choice of beneficiaries is based on a mix of direct observation and “wis- 
dom” accumulated by preceding generations. Far from being random, 
existing patterns of selection emphasize the role of gender and birth 
order. 
The selection of heirs along gender lines seems to be universal. In 
many foreign cultures parents mobilize resources selectively for the “es- 
tablishment of their children” (Fegan, 1983) and, more specifically, to 
provide sons with assets most likely to yield returns at least comparable 
to those enjoyed by preceding generations. Likewise, as many U.S. farm- 
ers continue to seek the efficiency of their income-producing estate, they 
favor their sons over their daughters to replace them as successors on 
the farm (Tarver, 1952; Salamon, 1980; Ditz, 1987; Carroll and Salamon, 
1988; Salamon and Davis Brown, 1988). 
While the pursuit of efficiency is based on the desire to perpetuate 
familial wealth, the amount of capital already accumulated influences 
whom testators choose as heirs. Wealthy individuals are said to favor 
their sons because the latter are more likely than their sisters to marry, 
have children, and carry forward the identity of the family (Smith, Kish, 
and Crawford, 1987). In a sample of wills collected in Ontario, the 
proportion of the largest estates exclusively bequeathed to sons is twice 
as large as that exclusively bequeathed to daughters (30 versus 15 per 
cent). Conversely, less wealthy testators are more generous toward their 
daughters because they are more likely to marry and produce grand- 
children than their brothers, even though their offspring do not bear 
the family name. The proportion of the smallest estates exclusively be- 
queathed to daughters is twice as large as that bequeathed to sons (19 
versus 9 per cent).6 
6In the United States, holders of small estates favor also their daughters (Menchik, 
Imine, and Jianakoplos, 1986; Cox, 1990). 
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While transfers mortis cilimi are not a11 similarly linked to the phys- 
ical perpetuation of kin groups, greater disparities in the bequests made 
by wealthy rather than poor testators in function of the gender of their 
respective heirs symbolizes the persistence of male oriented ideologies 
in America. 
Yet, differences in the bequests enjoyed by male and female heirs also 
depend on the nature rather the amount of wealth accumulated. As in- 
heritance involves the transfer of power, it is more likely to be construed 
as a male responsibility. In ;i sample of Irish and German American 
wealth holders who died in 1920 and in 1944, a relatively high number 
of those who did not have sons asked their sons-in-law to execute their 
wills and/or to manage the bequests to their daughters (Clignet. 1992). 
Even today, “inheritor men lament being thrust into adulthood a t  too 
young an age [while heiresses] lament being imprisoned too long in an 
adolescence with too little knowledge” (Schervish. 1994: 179). Even in 
the United States the definition of social maturity varies along ses lines. 
Similarly, the belief that productive ability varies with birth order 
continues to be evident in the practices of some segments of the U.S. 
population. In the Midwest the rules of primogeniture or of ultiniogeni- 
ture continue to prevail among Irish American farmers. In contrast, their 
neighbors of German descent continue to behave like their forebears in 
the northern part of Germany, dividing the farms into equal shares for 
each of their sons (Salamon, 1980). Underlying contrasts, however, re- 
flect differing factors. They may be the by-product of the differential 
attention that parents unconsciously devote to their offspring as a func- 
tion of their position in their own life cycle. They may also result from 
the differential mobility of these children, the first-born being often more 
likely to niove on to new places. Finally, these contrasts may be inspired 
by the specific models that govern parental choices.- 
To sum up, the pursuit of efficiency requires the combination of ma- 
terial and ideological conditions. In material terms, efficiency prevails 
whenever ( 1) income-producing assets comprise the largest component 
of estates, (2) the value of these estates is limited, and/or their man- 
agement costs high, and ( 3 )  testators groom eligihle heirs for the eco- 
nomic activity that constitutes the major source of wealth. 
In ideological terms, the idea of efficiency still prevails in communities 
that stress self-reliance and allow individualism to mis with utilitarian- 
ism (Glendon, 1987). Thus, while the pursuit of efficiency continues to 
occupy a preeminent position in the US. ideological landscape, the im- 
plicit emphasis placed on self-interest in the notion of testamentary ef- 
ficiency is said to benefit the larger society as well. For example, the 
’Thus, it would be beneficial to link the literature on the economis merits at the rule 
of primogeniture [Becker and Tomes, 198hj with the literature on  the merits imputed 
to first-horn children (Polit, 1987). 
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fact that testators choose few “fortunate” heirs should facilitate the ac- 
cumulation of the capital needed to give an impetus to the economy as 
a whole (Adam Smith as quoted by Becker [1981]). 
Heirship as a Recognition of Reciprocity 
Even though the word reciprocity has been around for a long time in 
the history of sociology (Hobhouse, 1906/1951; Thurnwald, 1932), a 
clear definition of the term has never been offered. Although Gouldner 
(1960) sought to clarify the term, he still offered disparate views of the 
multiple connotations of this notion. He characterized the sense of reci- 
procity as the outcome of a “mutually gratifying pattern of exchanging 
goods and services” (1960:170), in order to emphasize parallels be- 
tween the universality of the individual needs that generate social ex- 
changes and the universality of the norm that governs them. However, 
he also viewed reciprocity as the set of specific and complementary du- 
ties owed by role partners by virtue of the socially standardized roles 
they play, underlining the “transcendental” nature of the solidarity gov- 
erning intergenerational and conjugal bonds (Ekeh, 1974). 
As in the case for the notion of efficiency, the application of the no- 
tion of reciprocity to the analysis of inheritance or of gifts raises several 
theoretical problems. First, do reciprocal relations bind individuals or 
classes of individuals? Do these relations link the testator to his/her 
offspring as a whole, or only to some of his/her heirs? In the latter case, 
does the selection result from idiosyncratic whims and unexpected twists 
and turns in the lives of the actors concerned or from well-established 
traditions? Second, was Gouldner right when he argued that “the norm 
of reciprocity cannot apply with full force in relations with children, 
old people, or those who are mentally or physically handicapped” 
(1960:178)? To the German proverb that “a father is more generous 
toward his ten children than they are toward him,” one can counter 
that both childhood and old age represent universal experiences that 
create, as such, the very equality supposedly required by the ideology 
of reciprocity (Kessler, Masson, and Pestiaux, 19915).  
The Empirical Bases of Reciprocity, There are two empirical appli- 
cations of the ideology of reciprocity to inheritance. Moore (1967) strove 
to assess the negative impact of social change on the importance of in- 
heritance. Until the advent of Social Security, aging parents received 
support from their children as a quid pro quo for the property they 
passed down. Yet, both the additional life expectancy associated with 
economic development and the unavoidable likelihood that, during their 
final years, testators would use up the savings accumulated earlier have 
contributed to reduce the capital to be transferred. In any event, con- 
temporary heirs expect less from potential testators than the other way 
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around. Technological changes allow children to enjoy rewarding op- 
portunities more often than their parents did. Demographic changes al- 
low theni to be already sufficiently advanced in their occupational lives 
so that their survival does not depend on the additional wealth that 
inheritance represents. 
hlore ambitious, Caldwell (1982) sought to identify the impact of 
environniental forces on the direction and the regularity of the flow of 
wealth across generations. In agrarian contests, the flow runs “up- 
ward” to the profit of parents who have many children in the hope that 
at least one descendant will help them later in their lives. Conversely, 
in modern communities, the flow of wealth runs “downward” from 
parents to their children, some of whom can arbitrarily receive pref- 
erential treatment. Further, while modern Americans may expect from 
their offspring ‘1 return of love, devotion, and perhaps of some physical 
care during the later stages of their lives, almost nothing in the current 
parenting process allom-s fathers or mothers to expect any economic aid 
from their progeny. This raises the question of determining the pro- 
cesses by which people shift from monetary to nonmonetary forms of 
exchanges. 
The relative frequency and the value of the services exchanged be- 
tween parents and children differ across historical periods (hlodell, 1979). 
The dependence of children on parents is highest whenever the private 
costs of secondary and postsecondary education keep rising and/or 
whenever the private costs attached to housing and to the purchase of 
a first home escerd economic growth. In either case, children are forced 
to live longer with their parents or to ask for the latter’s financial aid. 
Alternatively, the dependence of parents on children is maximal when- 
ever the private costs attached to the maintenancc of the elderly exceed 
a critical threshold. With the generalization of Social Security and re- 
tirement programs, the incidence of the sense of reciprocity ,is an heir- 
ship motivation has probably declined. A t  the same time, psychological 
loneliness generated by .i longer life span has probably broadened the 
range of the forms of intergenerational dependence. This niay explain 
the conflicting evidcnce concerning the effect of the contactc rhat chil- 
dren maintain with parents on the bequests they receive (Tomes, 1981; 
hlenchik, Irvine, and Jianakoplos, 1986; Bernheim, Schleifer, and 
Summers, 1985). 
In a synchronic perspecti\ e, the frequency of rcciprocity L aries across 
national groups. During the past century, for instance. Irish parents im- 
migrating to New England wanted to buy J house as quickly AS possible. 
Thus, they sent their children to work in factories at an early age in 
order both to make the required donn payment and accumulate the 
savings necessary for securing the monthly palment of the mortgage. 
The subsequent absence of any lien on their property alw enabled them 
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to devote additional resources to the schooling of their youngest child. 
Variations in the opportunities enjoyed by first- and last-born male or 
female Irish American children of the period were probably accom- 
panied by corresponding contrasts in the forms of their respective mo- 
bility (Thernstrom, 1973). Most likely, first-born children capitalized 
on the savings associated with their free housing, whereas their younger 
siblings capitalized on their own academic achievement. In contrast, the 
Jewish immigrants who reached Boston at the same time were suffi- 
ciently wary of the discrimination experienced earlier in Europe to reject 
home ownership since this would have inhibited mobility and enhanced 
vulnerability to employer pressure. Instead, they preferred to help their 
children ascend on the educational ladder. In contrast to their Irish 
counterparts, Jewish immigrants were probably more prone to treat their 
children equally, since educational expenses were readily absorbed in 
the yearly familial budget. 
Today, as reciprocity remains perceived as the underpinning of fa- 
milial bonds, it is still a frequent motivation amongst most recent im- 
migrants, who have little knowledge of the help they might obtain from 
local community services. Thus, elderly Koreans, who retain at least 
part of their patriarchal orientations, continue to relinquish power and 
wealth to the heir-designate simply because they cannot believe that the 
latter might avoid repaying the favors bestowed on him (Cho, 1989).* 
More generally, as social change modifies the number and the na- 
ture of the services relatives expect of one another, it also widens the 
range of inheritance practices. There are greater variations in the size 
and form of bequests made in favor of daughters than of sons since 
aging parents expect more from the former than from the latter (Sussman, 
Cates, and Smith, 1970; Cox, 1990). In the same vein, the elderly res- 
idents of retirement homes sometimes disinherit their children in favor 
of fellow inmates, nurses, or social workers who have assisted them 
during the last moments of their lives (Rosenfeld, 1974, 1979). 
Heirship and Ascriptive Equality 
As a neologism, ascriptive equality evokes the making of uniformly 
fair bequests to all persons in equivalent status relationships. In this 
sense, inheritance represents a “culturally shared prescription of one- 
sided generosity” designed to stabilize patterns of social interaction be- 
tween generations (Gouldner, 1960: 164). Thus, testators shift from the 
productive ethic of stewardship which characterizes commitment to ef- 
ficiency to the distributive ethic of “noblesse oblige.” 
8 Respondents were likely to offer egalitarian answers when asked to indicate their 
preferences in a hypothetical situation but reversed themselves toward a more traditional 
choice when they took into account the actual composition of their progeny. 
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As such, the notion of ascriptive equality departs from Honians's (1 96 1 ) 
concept of distributive justice. By focusing on the targets rather than 
on the origins of bequests, Homans reminded 11s nevertheless that as- 
criptive equality generates two distinct behavioral outcomes. Justice or 
fairness may imply the pursuit of equality through a standardized so- 
lution (Sabine, 19.56:3). Gifts and bequests should be uniform, regard- 
less of the heirs' physical or cognitive endowments. Alternatively, justice 
may require testators to arbitrate between the economic achievements 
and/or the needs of eligible heirs (Rads .  1971; Kessler, Masson, and 
Pestiaux, 1991). In this sense, there is a recurrent tension benveen the 
equality and the identity of heirs (Boulding, 1975).y 
The Empirical Bases of Ascriprive Equality. Definitions of bequests 
based on ascriptive equality may originate from the community at large. 
In the case of successions ah imk~ti7t (those of individuals who die with- 
out a valid will), many states, notably those directly or indirectly in- 
spired by the French Civil Code (Arizona, Louisiana, California, Idaho, 
Nevada, New Mexico and Washington), define the mininial share to 
which surviving spouses or minor children are entitled, and in the case 
of those who have died childless, the shares that can be claimed by 
nieces and nephews, siblings, or ascendants (Shammas, Salmon, and 
Dahlin. 1987259-69). 
Decedents identifying intensely enough with the familial values ini- 
posed by the lawmakers of the state where they reside often replicate 
in their wills the provisions of the legislation (Carroll and Salamon, 
1988). Yet, the choices of most testators mirror differing interpretations 
of ascriptive equality. The relative number of US. testators making uni- 
form bequests to their children remains difficult to evaluate. Certain 
authors have placed the incidence of such egalitarian patterns at a mini- 
mum of 22 per cent (Tomes, 19S1), and others a t  R maximum of 87 
per cent (Menchik, 198S)."' Further, the meaning of these patterns 
changes with the extension of the peer group culture over the full span 
of the parental life cycle. Indeed, the continuing intimacy betxveen spouses 
is paralleled by a greater generational gap and by a commensurate de- 
cline in the distinction that parents perceive amongst their children 
(Clignet, 1992). As a result, partibility becomes synonymous with bc- 
nevolent indifference. 
Regardless of any ambiguity about the notion of equality, testators 
who are more sensitive to identity than to equality acknowledge the 
variability of their children's needs. For example, parents often expect 
'Roth Gordon (1966) and Roth (1991! gaie moving accounts of the normlrssness of 
"'These contrasts may reflect artificial v.iriations in the measurements used. Indeed 
hcneficiaries do not have the name perceptions of the bequests they hJse received as the 
test3tors who made such bequests. 
ituation in this regard kind of the ensuing clilemm*izs experienced by heirs. 
Strategies Governing Heir Selection in America 285 
their oldest daughters to act as substitute mothers and sacrifice them- 
selves in order to help redistribute life chances among their younger 
siblings (Greenhalgh [1985] for Taiwan examples; Fegan [1983] for il- 
lustrations in the Philippines; and Caldwell [ 19821 for Nigerian examples). 
Testators also base their choices on the matrimonial status of their 
offspring. Those who consider singlehood as a stigma provide their 
unmarried children with additional assets in order to enhance either 
their attractiveness in the field of eligibles or their economic autonomy 
(Rossi and Rossi, 1990). Yet, while the stigma varies with the heirs’ 
gender and birth order, the ensuing contrasts depend also on the na- 
tional origin and the religion of the testators under study (Adams and 
Kasakoff, 1994). 
Today, the importance of ascriptive equality increases also with the 
growing frequency of divorces. Divorced couples do not necessarily hold 
congruent definitions of “communities of equals” (Hochschild, 198 1). 
Further, some divorced men adhere to the symbolic equivalent of the 
rule of primogeniture in the bequests they make in favor of children 
born of a first union, because they do not want them to suffer from 
shifting affections and loyalties, but others conform with the symbolic 
equivalent of ultimogeniture by transferring a disproportionate share of 
their estate to the progeny they have begotten with their current spouse. 
As a result of the underlying normlessness, some U.S. testators use wills 
to favor the children of their divorced daughters (Weitzman, 1985). In- 
deed, this intervention is more frequent among maternal than paternal 
grandparents (Cherlin and Furstenberg, 1986). l1 
Regardless of these social factors, increases in the size and the diver- 
sity of an estate facilitate the implementation of ascriptive equality. The 
greater the diversity of assets accumulated, the easier it is to provide 
each heir with bequests that are symbolically equivalent to one another, 
but are nevertheless tailored to specific needs. As a result, the greater 
the diversity of assets, the more diverse the forms of equal bequests. For 
instance, testators provide some of their heirs with full property rights, 
while merely allowing others to enjoy the income of a trust created in 
their favor. Among the latter, the duration and the condition of trusts 
often vary across beneficiaries. 
Yet, new forms of individualism are also conducive to the erosion of 
the conventional definitions of familial bonds. A growing number of 
Americans feel they do not owe anything to the next generation, others 
that they should be wholly entitled to decide the fate of the monies they 
have accumulated. Rejecting any form of social control, they deny that 
any reduction of estate taxes would be used for selfish purposes. Such 
a reduction, they propose, would facilitate a proportionate rise in the 
11 The differential behavior of maternal and paternal grandparents is a reminder of 
the differential survival of the relevant kinship systems in complex industrialized societies. 
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gifts or bequests made to private charities or foundations (Woods, 1928; 
Barber, 1983). 
The Differential Profile of the Three Motivations 
The motivations governing heirship strategies differ in terms of their 
orientations toward objects. Inheritance is more likely to involve mone- 
tary terms when reciprocity is the dominant motivation. In contrast, the 
quest of efficiency requires testators to evaluate the productive capac- 
ities of their assets, while their commitment to ascriptive equality heightens 
their sensitivity to the needs and orientations of heirs, and hence to the 
symbols ro which the latter are attached. Wills that transfer specific 
artifacts loaded Lvith sy mbolic values (paintings, pieces of furniture, sil- 
verware) often make explicit reference to rhe personality of each ben- 
eficiary (Clignet, 1992). 
Testators differ also in the emphasis they place on the origin and the 
destination of the assets to he transferred. With its stress on familial 
financial interests, the pursuit of efficiency highlights the persistence of 
a gerontocratic ideology. Correspondingly, efficiency as a motivation is 
most likely to prevail wherever the elderly have the power to shape the 
rights and duties of potential heirs. Conversely, commitment to ascrip- 
tive equality underscores an allocentric view of familial identity, par- 
ticularly whenever bequests aim at counterbalancing individual misfor- 
tunes. As such, this commitment is likely to previ1 among social groups 
Lvherc individualism calls for the rank-ordering of the claims made by 
eligible heirs. Between these two poles, the sense of reciprocity can he 
expected to predominate in the context of cultures that seek to reconcile 
the ideals of individualism and equality. However, since the very notion 
of reciprocit) presupposes, at least implicitly, that testators and heirs 
experience differing needs, both remain bound together only so long as 
these nccds cannot he gratified elsewhere. 
Finally, each motivation is informed by two distinct time dimensions: 
the overall orientation toward the past or the future and the actual time 
table of transfers (hlasson and Gotman, 1991; Reason, 1979). Insofar 
‘IS the pursuit of efficiency highlights the returns to be expected from 
an initial investment, the stress it places on the future is likely to be 
most frequent in entrepreneurial societies that extol the notion of risk. 
Commitment to ascriptive equality, on the other hand, is past oriented 
to the extent that it is basically informed by the moral precedents that 
form the quesr for legitimacy. Indeed, insofar as the pursuit of ascriptive 
equality implies the desire to do the right thing, the practices of pre- 
ceding generations are seen as exemplary. As a result, this motivation 
is likely to be most frequent among social groups characterized hy and 
committed to stability. In the middle of the continuum, reciprocity im- 
plies reversible time orientations, testators and beneficiaries invoking 
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the memory of deeds already performed in their favor as well as antici- 
pating the benefits expected in the future. 
Apart from these subjective time orientations, the transfers inspired 
by each motivation involve differing time tables. Both the pursuit of 
efficiency and the commitment to ascriptive equality allow transfers to 
be independent of the testator’s death. For instance, some parents are 
explicit about the fact that their underwriting of tuition fees or contri- 
butions to the purchase of a home will stand in lieu of the subsequent 
“final payment” that a bequest represents. In contrast, the flow of ser- 
vices evoked by the notion of reciprocity remains more structured. The 
flow goes one way at specific moments in the life cycle of heirs (child- 
hood to early adulthood) and the other way at other moments in the 
life cycle of testators (retirement). 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to identify three major plausible 
testamentary motivations and to suggest how each results from a set of 
dialectical interactions between material and cultural determinants. 
In material terms, the analysis highlights the influence of both the 
economic profile of the larger society and the social status of individual 
testators. The overall value and the diversity of accumulated wealth 
condition the variability of heirship strategies. Similarly, the nature of 
occupational roles affects the control that testators exert over their eli- 
gible heirs. Further, the length of the U.S. experience acquired by im- 
migrating families affects both the chances of gaining access to riches 
and the knowledge of procedures that maximize savings and lower taxes. 
In cultural terms, the analysis highlights both the converging and di- 
verging influences that major reference groups (gender, national origin, 
religious affiliation, or social class) exert on the heirship practices of 
U.S. testators. 
The next step of the analysis would be to assess the distribution of 
these three motivations amongst various groups. For instance, to the 
extent that the pursuit of efficiency characterizes self-employed individ- 
uals, its frequency should keep declining. Alternatively, as reciprocity 
influences the familial groups least likely to receive public forms of so- 
cial assistance, it should remain maximal among newer waves of im- 
migrants. Finally, while commitment to ascriptive equality becomes more 
visible with societal affluence and/or with the shift of an increasing 
number of risks from the private to the public sector, its forms will 
doubtless become increasingly differentiated. 
Yet, the motivations identified here are useful only insofar as they 
help ascertain how variations in the testamentary behaviors of major 
social groups might alter the current U.S. social and economic fabric. 
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First, the impact of these motivations on macro social structures is a 
function of the t d z i e  of the estates. To the extent that the amount of 
wealth accumulated affects the specific practices inspired by each mo- 
tivation, the corresponding selection of heirs should modify contrasts 
in their respective socioeconomic trajectories. But patterns of stratifi- 
cation and their perpetuation vary also with the composition of estates. 
For example, depending on whether they own life insurance or real es- 
tate, individuals of similar wealth make different types of bequests. 
Time lags between changes in the economic conditions and the cul- 
tural worldviews of major social groups make it necessary to explore 
the dynamics of each of these motivations and the ensuing shifts of their 
social distribution (Ogburn, 1PSSj. For instance, 1 noted earlier that 
Irish American and German American farmers in the Midwest retain 
the modes of inheritance specific to their respective countries of origin. 
Yet, it remains necessary to ascertain (1)  how long ethnic models of 
intergenerational transfers persist in a new environment, (2) whether 
these models are restricted to farmers or are common to all self-employed 
individuals, and (3) whether these models apply to other immigrant groups 
as well. 
Similarly, as the relationship between economic and cultural change 
is not mechanical, social groups may use the additional opportunities 
created by technological innovations or  shifts in the market to restore 
selectively some of the values to which they remain committed but which 
they have been obliged to ahandon earlier as a result of declining re- 
sources (Cole and Wolf, 1974).” Thus, they might use the additional 
wealth generated by economic growth to invent forms o f  transfers that 
are symbolically equivalent to those of the past. For example, even though 
high-quality education replaces the rich land of the past as a valued 
asset, contrasts between the nvo forms of capital and the conditions of 
their transfers should not mask similarities between these two forms of 
inheritance when both are inspired hy the qucst of efficiency (Carrier, 
1991). Indeed, since Americans, and notably those who are first- 
generation immigrants, are often divided between their commitment to 
the notion of progress, inspired by the notion of melting pot, and their 
nostalgia for the cultural order of the national or religious community 
from which they originate, it remains necessary to ascertain how they 
solve the “sociological ambivalences’’ that accompany competing cul- 
tural definitions of their roles as testators (hlerton and Barber, 1963). 
The last item of the agenda opened by the exploration of inheritance 
issues concerns the reluctance of many U.S. sociologists to undertake a 
full-fledged study of rransfers mortis C ~ S J .  Even though wills afford 
testators the opportunity to “sum-up fully” the essence of their lives 
”Thi, illustr~tes the more general principle of \electi\r retention (Lel’ine, 19-31. 
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(Bryant and Snizek, 1975:225), few practitioners are interested in ana- 
lyzing this summation. Functionalist theorists have viewed inheritance 
as being inimical to economic development and have argued that in- 
dividual status should be based exclusively on achievement (Davis and 
Moore, 1945; Tumin, 1967).13 Alternatively, their radical opponents 
disregard inheritance as typical of patriarchal arrangements that have 
now been undermined by corporate capitalism (Bowles and Gintis, 1986). 
In methodological terms, the common stress that both functionalist and 
radical views place on work as the primary source of status blurs the 
distinction between wealth and income and exacerbates the difficulty 
of obtaining information about the former. As a result, empirical studies 
on bequests and sources of income other than wages and salaries remain 
scarce and recent (Solmon, 1974). 
Yet as long as the profession keeps ignoring intergenerational forms 
of solidarity, including inheritance, it is impossible to evaluate the in- 
terrelations between intra- and interfamilial inequities, and in this sense, 
the interrelation between familial arrangements and the extent as well 
as the dynamics of social stratification. SSQ 
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